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Electoral systems |
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Tideman's Alternative Method, also called Alternative Smith or Alternative Schwartz, is an electoral system developed by Nicolaus Tideman which selects a single winner using votes that express preferences.
This method is Smith-efficient, making it a kind of Condorcet method. It uses instant-runoff voting for cycle resolution.
The Alternative Smith procedure is as follows:
Alternative Smith strongly resists both strategic nomination and strategic voting by political parties or coalitions (although like every system, it can still be manipulated in some situations). The Smith and runoff components of Smith-runoff cover up each other's weaknesses:
The combination of these two methods creates a highly-resistant system.
Alternative Smith fails independence of irrelevant alternatives, meaning it can sometimes be affected by spoiler candidates. However, the method adheres to a weaker property that eliminates most spoilers, sometimes called independence of Smith-dominated alternatives (ISDA). This method states that if one candidate (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will still win the election as long as Y is not in the highest-ranked cycle.
The following table compares Alternative Smith with other single-winner election methods:
Criterion: | Majority | Majority loser | Mutual majority |
Condorcet winner |
Condorcet loser |
Smith |
ISDA |
LIIA |
IIA |
Cloneproof | Monotone | Participation |
Later-no-harm |
Later-no-help |
No favorite betrayal | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Anti-plurality | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | |
Approval | Yes | No | No | No |
No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | |
Baldwin | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | |
Black | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | |
Borda count | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | |
Bucklin | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | |
Coombs | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | |
Copeland | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | |
Dodgson | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | |
Highest median | Yes | Yes |
No |
No |
No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Yes | Yes | No |
No | Yes | Yes | |
Instant-runoff | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | |
Kemeny–Young | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | |
Minimax | Yes | No | No | Yes |
No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No |
No | No | |
Nanson | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | |
Plurality | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | |
Random ballot |
No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
Ranked pairs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No |
No | No | No | |
Runoff | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | |
Schulze | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
No | No | No | |
Score | No | No | No | No |
No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | |
Sortition |
No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
STAR | No | Yes | No | No |
Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | |
Tideman alternative | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | |
Table Notes |
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