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Much of what we see here seems well-intended, yet still seems mildly infected with subtle inaccuracies here and there.
Unless someone would like to give this material some thought (and some thoughtful corrections), perhaps I'll wander back and perform some pruning myself when I have time.
By the time you read this, you may still find such an example in the closing lines of the second paragraph.
I understand what the writer correctly intended (no exchange sets prices; its employees simply record, process, and disseminate the prices transacted by independent floor brokers and floor traders in the open-outcry trading ring), yet what sits there now might easily mislead the casual reader, or might even feed some popular and dangerous misconceptions that already abound:
Virtually none of the floor-trading exchange members represented "a big corporation" except as an independent agent, executing just another order, incidentally and anonymously, obligated only to buy at the lowest price possible, or to sell at the highest price possible, at the instant that broker's runner, phone clerk, or messaging device had flashed the anonymous customer's order to the broker's "deck" of orders, one among hundreds of others in the steady stream of "paper" that flowed from the phones to the pits in Chicago, or the "rings" in New York.
No "individual company that trades on the exchange must send its own independent brokers."
Very few companies that send orders to the exchange maintained brokers of their own of the floor (when there was a trading floor). A "big corporation" (e.g., Hersey in cocoa and sugar; Kodak, once-upon-a-time, in silver at Comex; Minute-Maid in orange juice) that uses the exchange to transfer corporate risk to speculators by neutralizing the risk of the corporation's commercial position (e.g., inventory expanded in the face of perceived tightness of supply, or catalogue commitments to sell finished at a fixed price without having first locked in the price of raw materials) with an offsetting, opposite position in the futures market always sent such a hedge order to the floor anonymously, often via any one of the many major brokerage houses, usually to one of many independent, fiercely competitive local floor brokers.
Throughout the era of open-outcry, floor-traded federally licensed futures contract markets in the USA, an exchange membership with floor trading privileges was held only in the name of an individual, and while some of the larger brokerage firms did own memberships (while designating an individual employee as the member of record for each exchange seat owned by the firm) in order to maintain a presence on the trading floor, most of the floor brokers executing orders flowing to the exchange from throughout the world were independent competitors in that ultimately free-market process of "discovering" the equilibrium price in response to the incessant ebb and flow of new information and impressions, predictions and projections, rumors, news (and, as some have said throughout the ages, "hope, fear, greed and prayer") that induce one with a capital commitment and exposure to risk in such a market to shift one's position, sometimes as nimbly as a sailor at the helm of a small craft making incessant changes in response to a shifting wind in a heavy sea.
In a truly unfettered, free-market context, with thousands of independent, unrelated buyers and sellers assuming the risk of loss from moment to moment, such a price discovery mechanism acts like a precisely responsive thermometer for price: an instantaneous snapshot from moment to moment of the aggregate perception of "value." The market does not determine price, but rather reveals it: price discovery. Price continues to change in the absence of the market's availability to reflect it, just as heat remains in the oven even if one chooses to remove the thermometer.
The mechanism of the market has reflected price accurately only when ample participation by speculation has provided sufficient liquidity to offset commercial transactions, and that will remain true when every trading floor has fallen silent with universal conversion to the electronic exchange.
NYBOT did not exist (as a futures exchange) when the movie, Trading Places, appeared in 1983, and so that film could not have "featured" that exchange. Moreover that movie quite inaccurately depicted the orange juice futures trading area of The Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, although I must confess I had not seen the trading ring for juice first-hand in the decade before that time.
Just four years earlier, the Coffee and Sugar Exchange merged with the New York Cocoa Exchange to form the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE).
It was not until 1998 that the merger of the New York Cotton Exchange and CSCE acquired the parental name of The New York Board of Trade, a name which retired when its new owner renamed the exchange ICE Futures.
{{ help}} Shouldn't this page be changed to ICE Futures US since changing their name? Southwood Paul ( talk) 00:06, 5 December 2009 (UTC)
The result of the move request was not done. No consensus between the two participants thus far; feel free to relist if further input is required. Skomorokh 06:58, 27 December 2009 (UTC)
New York Board of Trade → ICE Futures US — This should be changed since the name of the company is changed back in 2007. I could understand like Chyrlser not being changed after take over but this is a complete change with no similarities. Southwood Paul ( talk) 00:32, 5 December 2009 (UTC)